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Abstract
We measure selection among high-skilled emigrants from Germany using predicted
earnings. Migrants to less equal countries are positively selected relative to non-
migrants, while migrants to more equal countries are negatively selected, consistent
with the prediction in Borjas (1987). Positive selection to less equal countries re-
flects university quality and grades, and negative selection to more equal countries
reflects university subject and gender. Migrants to the United States are highly
positively selected and concentrated in STEM fields. Our results highlight the rel-
evance of the Borjas model for high-skilled individuals when credit constraints and
⇤Matthias Parey: University of Essex and Institute for Fiscal Studies, m.parey@es-
sex.ac.uk, Jens Ruhose: Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover, ruhose@wipol.uni-hannover.de,
Fabian Waldinger: London School of Economics, f.waldinger@lse.ac.uk, Nicolai Netz:
DZHW, netz@dzhw.eu. We thank the editor Amit Khandelwal and three anonymous
referees for very helpful comments. We also thank Clement de Chaisemartin, Thomas
Crossley, Christian Dustmann, Tim Hatton, Hans Hvide, Julian Johnsen, Gordon Kemp
and participants in various seminars. We thank Kolja Briedis, Christian Kerst, and Gre-
gor Fabian for providing access to the DZHW data. This study uses data from the Swiss
Labour Force Survey (Schweizerische Arbeitskra¨fteerhebung, BFS ). Parey gratefully ac-
knowledges the support of the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-Social Change (MiSoC)
at the University of Essex.
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Introduction
International migration of high-skilled individuals has risen dramatically in recent
decades (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012). Between 2000 and 2006, the United States at-
tracted 1.9 million and European OECD countries attracted 2.2 million tertiary-educated
migrants (Widmaier and Dumont, 2011). In the year 2000, high-skilled migrants repre-
sented about 11% of the tertiary-educated population in OECD countries (Bru¨cker et al.,
2012). In the United States, as of 2013, about 19% of the working-age population with a
bachelor’s degree or higher were foreign-born. In certain fields such as science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (STEM), more than 30% were foreign-born.1
Access to high-skilled individuals is central to firms’ success, and has become even
more important in economies where ideas drive technological progress (Chambers et al.,
1998). When the homegrown pool of high-skilled individuals is insu cient, the ability
to attract high-skilled migrants is crucial for improving the quality of a country’s work-
force and its innovative capacity. A deeper understanding of the selection of high-skilled
migrants is therefore important – for sending and receiving countries alike.
While migrant selection has been studied extensively since Borjas (1987) outlined
theoretical predictions for selection, few papers have studied the selection of high-skilled
migrants. Focusing our analysis on high-skilled migrants who mostly migrate between
developed countries enables us to investigate a setting where individuals face low legal
barriers to migration, and relatively small migration costs. The economic forces described
by the Borjas model should be particularly relevant in our setup.2
1Authors’ calculations based on the 2013 ACS (Ruggles et al., 2010).
2See section 1.2 for a review of empirical papers investigating migrant selection across
the entire skill distribution. The existing papers on migrant selection mostly focus on
low-skilled migration between Mexico and the United States, where migrants face higher
2
A basic version of the Borjas (1987, 1991) model, building on Roy (1951), predicts
that migrants to less equal countries, such as the United States, should be positively se-
lected, while migrants to more equal countries, such as Denmark, should be negatively
selected. Analyzing migration to both less and more equal countries is therefore partic-
ularly valuable to test the predictions of the model.
We study the selection of high-skilled emigrants by investigating migration decisions of
graduates from German universities. Germany exhibits an intermediate level of inequality
for high-skilled individuals (Figure 1). By studying selection to less and more equal
countries in the same context, we can test both predictions of the Roy/Borjas model.
Furthermore, we are able to test whether the predictions of the Roy/Borjas model hold
within the population of university graduates.3
We use rich survey data on German university graduates collected by the German
Centre for Higher Education Research and Science Studies (DZHW). German university-
bound students represent a more selective group than their counterparts in most econom-
ically developed countries; this allows us to study migration patterns of the top 11% of
the educational distribution.4
migration costs and legal barriers to entry. Other papers on high-skilled migrants study
other outcomes, such as e↵ects on the receiving economy (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle,
2010, Kerr and Lincoln, 2010, Borjas and Doran, 2012, Moser et al., 2014, Kerr et al.,
2015, Doran et al., 2014) and on source countries (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012).
3Since many papers investigate migrant selection between two countries only (see
Online Appendix Table A.1), they are limited to testing one of the two predictions of
the Roy/Borjas model. While Borjas et al. (2015) study migration from Denmark to
multiple destinations, they focus on positive selection because Denmark has very low
levels of inequality.
4Administrative data show that about 11% of the cohorts that we study in our paper
graduated from university. In 2012, the stock of university graduates among 35 to 44
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To measure selection we compare predicted earnings of migrants and non-migrants.
We first estimate an augmented Mincer regression for graduates who work in Germany.
We then use the estimated returns to construct predicted earnings independently of
whether the graduate stays in Germany or migrates abroad. Our data contain a rich
set of personal characteristics including family background, high school grades, univer-
sity education (including the specific university, subject, and grades), and information on
mobility before enrolling at university. These detailed characteristics allow us to obtain
predicted earnings as a precise measure of individual earnings potential, so that we can
di↵erentiate between high- and low-productivity graduates. We then compare cumula-
tive distribution functions of predicted earnings for three groups of graduates: graduates
who stay in Germany, graduates who migrate to less equal countries, and graduates who
migrate to more equal countries. This allows us to investigate whether the most or least
skilled university graduates stay in Germany or select into more or into less equal destina-
tions. To classify destinations into either more or less equal countries, we construct new
inequality measures for university graduates, based on individual-level income surveys
from 20 countries.
The selection of university graduates is consistent with the predictions of the basic
Roy/Borjas model. Migrants to less equal countries have significantly higher predicted
earnings than non-migrants. Migrants to more equal countries, in contrast, have signifi-
cantly lower predicted earnings than non-migrants. These findings hold along the whole
distribution of predicted earnings. In fact, the selection patterns predicted by the model
hold even within subgroups of either more equal or less equal countries.
The coe cients of the Mincer regression, which form the basis of our earnings pre-
diction, might be biased if migrants were non-randomly selected from the population of
graduates in a way not captured by our observed covariates. We address potential selec-
year-olds was 1,208,000 out of a population of 11,004,000 (DESTATIS, 2013, p. 27).
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tion in the augmented Mincer regression using a sample selection correction (Heckman,
1979). In the selection equation we use the roll-out of ERASMUS, the largest study
abroad program, as an instrumental variable to predict whether individuals move abroad
or work in Germany. Changes in the number of ERASMUS places are a good predictor
of international migration (Parey and Waldinger, 2011). Using the selection-corrected
Mincer regression we confirm our main results. We also show that our results are not
driven by our particular measure of earnings inequality or by potentially confounding
factors that may be correlated with cross-country inequality.
Additionally, we show that our results hold for migrants to European countries only.
Migration costs to these countries are low because workers can move freely between Euro-
pean countries without the need for work visas. In further results we show that migrants
to Austria and Switzerland, two countries with higher earnings inequality than Germany,
are positively selected, as predicted by the Roy/Borjas model. These countries provide a
useful setting to test for migrant selection because migration costs are particularly low:
the two countries share a border with Germany, are predominately German-speaking,
and they have broadly similar labor market institutions, benefit systems, and cultures.
Furthermore, Germans do not need visas to work in Austria or Switzerland.
In additional results, we decompose predicted earnings to identify the characteristics
that explain the observed selection patterns. Migrants to less equal countries have better
university grades, attend better universities, and come from families with higher socio-
economic backgrounds. Migrants to more equal countries have studied subjects with lower
returns in the labor market, they are more likely to be female, and they attend universi-
ties associated with lower labor market prospects. Interestingly, migrants to more equal
destinations are, in fact, positively selected in terms of university grade. Selection pat-
terns are thus consistent with the model predictions for most, but not all, characteristics.5
5A multidimensional extension of the Roy/Borjas model indicates that focusing on a
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Predicted earnings provide a comprehensive summary measure of expected productivity
that drives migration decisions.
Finally, we investigate selection to the United States, one of the most important
destinations of high-skilled emigrants from Germany. In the United States, earnings
inequality among university graduates is much higher than in Germany. As predicted
by the Roy/Borjas model, emigrants from Germany to the United States are positively
selected, compared to non-migrants. We show that migrants to the United States are
positively selected across almost all characteristics not only compared to non-migrants
in Germany, but also compared to U.S. natives. We also document that migrants from
Germany to the United States are particularly concentrated in high-paying STEM fields.
Overall, high-skilled individuals form an important group of potential migrants, both
because of their relatively high rates of mobility and their potential contribution to the
host economy. Studying migrant selection in this context is particularly useful because
these migrants face low formal barriers to migration and because they are unlikely to
be credit constrained. The observed selection patterns underline the relevance of the
Roy/Borjas model in this setting.
1 A Model of Migrant Selection and Existing Empirical Evidence
1.1 Roy/Borjas Model of Migrant Selection
In his seminal work, Borjas (1987, 1991) proposes a theoretical framework for under-
standing the selection of international migrants. To motivate our empirical analysis, we
use important insights of the Roy/Borjas model to highlight the predictions for selec-
tion. In our context, university graduates decide whether to migrate based on earnings
opportunities abroad (w1) and at home (w0), and migration costs (c). In this framework,
single characteristic may not reflect the overall pattern of selection, depending on the
correlation with other relevant characteristics. See Dustmann et al. (2011) for a model
with two types of skills.
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potential log earnings consist of an observed component (✓j, where j = 0 indicates home
and j = 1 indicates abroad) and an unobserved component (✏j):
logw0 = ✓0 + ✏0 (1)
logw1 = ✓1 + ✏1. (2)
Taking migration costs (c) into account, individuals will move abroad if the wage gain is
larger than the migration costs:
Migrate=1 if ✓1 + ✏1 > ✓0 + ✏0 + c. (3)
The vector of potential outcomes is (✓0, ✓1, ✏0, ✏1). For tractability, we assume that







✏1). Mean earnings at home and abroad are represented by µj, and the
variance of the observed component in each country is represented by  2✓j . We allow each
type of skills (observables and unobservables) to be correlated across countries, but not
across types of skills.  ✓0,✓1 is the covariance in the observed component across coun-
tries. We refer to the corresponding correlation as ⇢✓. While our framework incorporates
observed and unobserved skills, this does not a↵ect the underlying economic mechanism
developed by Borjas (1987, 1991).6
We now consider how earnings potential at home, ✓0, of migrants di↵ers from the
population mean µ0. From the normality assumption we obtain









1   (z) , (5)
where v = ✓1 + ✏1   ✓0   ✏0 is the earnings di↵erence between abroad and home that has
6Borjas (1987) develops the original model focusing on the role of unobservables. In the
formulation here, this corresponds to the case of  ✓0 =  ✓1 = 0. Borjas (1991) introduces
the distinction between returns to observables and unobservables, focusing on the case
where observable skills are perfectly correlated across countries (corr(✓0, ✓1) = 1).
7
variance  2v . z = (µ0 + c   µ1)/ v is a constant reflecting di↵erences in means across
destinations, adjusted for migration costs and normalized by the variance of the earnings
di↵erence. In our empirical analysis, we investigate how selection on observables relates
to relative inequality ( ✓0/ ✓1) between the two destinations.
7 In addition to relative in-
equality, the theoretical prediction on selection depends on the cross-country correlation
in the observed component (⇢✓). A situation where ⇢✓ is su ciently high provides a natu-
ral benchmark case because we analyze migration flows between industrialized countries.8
If the potential destination is less equal than home ( ✓1 >  ✓0), migrants will be positively
selected: E(✓0|Migrate=1) > µ0. Intuitively, the positively selected migrants benefit from
the upside opportunities in less equal countries. If the potential destination country is
more equal ( ✓1 <  ✓0), migrants will be negatively selected: E(✓0|Migrate=1) < µ0.
Intuitively, the negatively selected migrants benefit from the insurance of a compressed
wage distribution in more equal countries.
The model emphasizes the role of earnings inequality for the selection of migrants.
Di↵erences in mean earnings between home and abroad have strong e↵ects on migration
probabilities (see term z above), but they have no e↵ect on the direction of selection.
Borjas (1991) extends the model to include stochastic migration costs, leading to
very similar results as long as the migration costs are unrelated to potential earnings;
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) emphasize that selection patterns can change substantially
when migration costs vary systematically with earnings potential. Because we are focusing
on high-skilled individuals who migrate from an economically developed country to other
developed countries, di↵erential migration costs are presumably less important than for
7Our data include a rich set of observable characteristics, which allow us to construct
an informative measure of skills. See Gould and Moav (2016) for an analysis that inves-
tigates selection on unobservable skills.
8This rules out the case of ‘refugee sorting’ (Borjas 1987).
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lower-skilled migrants who, e.g., migrate from Mexico to the United States.
1.2 Empirical Evidence on the Roy/Borjas Model
Most empirical papers on international migrant selection study settings where mi-
grants face legal barriers to migration and migration costs are relatively high. Existing
papers di↵er along two main dimensions that a↵ect observed selection patterns. First,
di↵erent papers use di↵erent skill measures to evaluate selection, and second, they study
migration flows between a varying set of countries (see Online Appendix Table A.1). A
large part of the empirical literature has studied emigration from Mexico to the United
States. While some of these papers find evidence for negative selection that is consistent
with the basic Roy/Borjas model (e.g. Ibarraran and Lubotsky, 2007, Ferna´ndez-Huertas
Moraga, 2011, Kaestner and Malamud, 2014, for some characteristics), other papers find
intermediate selection that suggests that migration costs vary with skills, perhaps driven
by poverty constraints (Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005, Orrenius and Zavodny, 2005, Kaest-
ner and Malamud, 2014, for other characteristics). In their seminal paper, Chiquiar and
Hanson (2005) show that a model with skill-varying migration costs provides a better
description of migration flows from Mexico to the United States.
A number of other papers investigate migrant selection between other pairs of coun-
tries. The selection of migrants from Puerto Rico to the United States is consistent with
the model predictions (Ramos, 1992, Borjas, 2008). Migrant selection from either Nor-
way or Israel to the United States is only partly consistent with the model predictions
(Abramitzky et al., 2012, Gould and Moav, 2016).
Lastly, a number of papers investigate migrant selection between multiple countries.
Some papers find support for the model predictions (e.g. Borjas, 1987, Borjas et al., 2015,
Stolz and Baten, 2012), while other cross-country studies find only partial support for
the basic Roy/Borjas model (Belot and Hatton, 2012), or reject the model predictions
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(Feliciano, 2005, Grogger and Hanson, 2011).9
We are not aware of other papers that focus on the role of inequality for the selection
of high-skilled migrants.10 Studying these migrants is particularly useful because they
face low legal barriers to migration and relatively small migration costs.
2 Data
2.1 Data on University Graduates
We analyze the selection of high-skilled migrants using survey data on university
graduates collected by the German Centre for Higher Education Research and Science
Studies (DZHW). These data come from nationally representative longitudinal surveys of
individuals who complete their university education in Germany (for details see Grotheer
et al., 2012). The DZHW sampled university graduates from the graduation cohorts
1992-93, 1996-97, 2000-01, and 2004-05.11 We refer to the cohorts by the second year, i.e.
1993 for the 1992-93 cohort. Graduates in each cohort are surveyed twice. The initial
survey takes place about 12 months after graduation. The same individuals participate
in a follow-up survey about five years after graduation (Online Appendix Figure A.1).
The survey is ideal for our purposes because graduates are surveyed even if they move
abroad. We focus our analysis on migration decisions that are measured five years after
9Our focus is on the selection of international migrants. A number of papers investi-
gate the Roy/Borjas model applied to internal migration, including Borjas et al. (1992),
Dahl (2002), Abramitzky (2009), and Bartolucci et al. (2014).
10Recent papers have highlighted the role of taxes for the migration of inventors and
soccer players (Akcigit et al., 2016, Kleven et al., 2013).
11Between 1993 and 2005, the majority of German university graduates completed
degrees called Diplom,Magister, or Staatsexamen. These degrees are usually completed in
four to six years, and are considered comparable to a master’s degree in other countries in
standard international classifications (ISCED 5A according to the International Standard
Classification of Education).
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graduation.12 The surveys are based on a stratified cluster sampling, with fields of study,
degree types, and universities as strata (Grotheer et al., 2012), and they are representative
for the examined population. Response rates to the initial surveys range between 30%
and 40%, depending on the cohort. We analyze di↵erences in response rates between
the initial survey and the follow-up survey according to migration status reported in the
initial survey. The follow-up survey response rate is 66% for graduates who have worked
in Germany during the initial survey and 59% for graduates who have worked abroad.
While this di↵erence is statistically significant in a simple t-test, we cannot reject that
di↵erences in response rates are uncorrelated to observable characteristics. This suggests
that attrition does not change our findings. We also verify that our results hold when we
include the full sample from the initial survey by carrying forward the reponses from the
initial survey (see Online Appendix A.3 for details, results are shown in Online Appendix
Figure A.3 and in Online Appendix Table A.6).
Five years after graduation, the total number of respondents is 6,737 (1993 cohort),
6,237 (1997 cohort), 5,426 (2001 cohort), and 6,459 (2005 cohort). We focus on gradu-
ates from traditional universities.13 We restrict the sample to full-time workers because
12After graduation, many university graduates enroll in additional training such as
legal or teacher traineeships (Referendariat), or PhD programs. Earnings in the initial
survey are thus a noisy measure of earnings potential.
13The German higher education sector consists of traditional universities, universities
of applied sciences (Fachhochschulen), specialized universities (focusing on arts, music,
or theology), and a small number of private universities. The best students tend to enroll
in traditional universities. To estimate the Heckman selection model we also restrict the
sample to graduates from universities where at least one graduate works abroad. These
sample restrictions reduce the sample by around 30%. Results that include all institutions
are very similar to our main findings (see Online Appendix Figure A.4).
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migrating part-time workers are more likely to be tied movers (see Borjas and Bronars,
1991; Junge et al., 2014). In our data, full-time labor force participation is about 77%.
The graduate survey data contain detailed information on graduates’ personal char-
acteristics, family background, study history, and labor market experience (Table 1). In
addition to the variables summarized in Table 1, we also have detailed information on a
graduate’s university and field of study. Five years after graduation, 5.2% of graduates
work abroad. The main destinations are Switzerland, the United States, the UK, Austria,
and France (Online Appendix Table A.2).
2.2 Data on Earnings Inequality
We classify destination countries as either more or less equal than Germany using
newly constructed measures of earnings inequality for university graduates. Existing
inequality measures, such as Gini coe cients, typically measure inequality for the over-
all population, but the decisions of high-skilled migrants will likely depend on earnings
inequality of university graduates.
Our main data source is the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) (2013). The LIS pro-
vides access to individual-level earnings surveys from several countries. The database
covers di↵erent years for each country. We use all available survey years for the main
destinations of German university graduates (see Table A.3 for available survey years in
each country). Switzerland and Austria are important destinations for German university
graduates but only have relatively limited coverage in the LIS database. We therefore
augment the LIS data with additional data for Austria (Microcensus 1999 and EU-SILC
2007, 2008) and Switzerland (Labour Force Survey 1998-2005).
To measure earnings inequality for high-skilled individuals, we restrict the samples
in the individual-level income surveys to university graduates. We further restrict the
samples to full-time employees of working age, and we exclude individuals who are self-
employed, enrolled in educational institutions, or who report negative earnings.
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Based on the individual-level surveys, we construct earnings percentiles for each coun-
try and available year using the survey sampling weights (see Online Appendix Table A.3).
Some surveys in the (augmented) LIS data report gross earnings, while others report net
earnings. To measure cross-country inequality of net earnings, we convert gross into net
earnings using the net personal average tax rate of single persons without children from
the OECD (2013c).14 The Data Appendix B.1 provides more detail on the construction
of the inequality measures.
In our main analysis, we use the ratio of the 75th to the 25th earnings percentile
(75/25 ratio) for university graduates to measure earnings inequality across countries.
Figure 1 shows the ranking of countries according to the 75/25 ratio that we average
over 1998 to 2010 to reflect the years that correspond to our graduate surveys (Online
Appendix Table A.4 reports 75/25 ratios for each country). Inequality is highest in the
United States, followed by France and Poland. The Scandinavian countries and Australia
are most equal. Germany is ranked in the middle.15 We can therefore investigate the
14The net personal average tax rate is defined as the personal income tax and employee
social security contributions net of cash benefits, expressed as a percentage of gross wage
earnings. The OECD reports three di↵erent tax rates along the earnings distribution:
the average tax rate at 67%, at 100%, and at 167% of average earnings. We apply the tax
rate at 67% of average earnings to the 25th percentile and below, the tax rate at 100% of
average earnings to earnings between the 25th and the 75th percentile, and the tax rate
at 167% of average earnings to the 75th percentile and above.
15Recent papers have used large administrative datasets to documente a rise in German
earnings inequality during the last decades (Dustmann et al., 2009, Card et al., 2013).
In these datasets, earnings are censored at the maximum of social security contributions.
For university graduates, 42% (13%) of observations for males (females) are top-coded be-
tween 1998 and 2008. Because university graduates are in the top 11% of the educational
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selection of German university graduates into less equal and into more equal countries.16
2.3 Data on ERASMUS Places
As part of our estimation procedure, which we explain below, we use data on the
number of ERASMUS places to correct for potential selection bias. We obtain data on
the number of study abroad places in the ERASMUS program by university, subject, and
year from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). The median internationally
mobile student studies abroad for one or two semesters about three years before gradu-
ation. We assign the number of ERASMUS places in the corresponding academic year,
subject, and university to each student. To account for di↵erences in cohort size that af-
fect students’ study abroad opportunities, we normalize the number of ERASMUS places
with the number of students in the corresponding university and subject (for details see
Parey and Waldinger, 2011).
3 Methods and Results
3.1 The Selection of Migrants to More and to Less Equal Destinations
For our analysis, we use predicted earnings to measure earnings potential in the home
country. This measure of skill represents ✓0 in the model outlined above. We then use
predicted earnings to compare the distribution of skills of migrants to less equal countries,
of migrants to more equal countries, and of non-migrants.
To construct predicted earnings, we estimate an augmented Mincer regression for
distribution, we prefer to use earnings surveys in the LIS that are not top-coded.
16As we measure selection with predicted earnings, an ideal measure of inequality would
be based on country-level di↵erences in returns to observed skills. Such a measure would
require graduate datasets with comparable characteristics on each graduate for all major
destinations. As these are not available, we use the 75/25 ratio that is based on actual
earnings. The empirical results are valid as long as countries with higher 75/25 ratios
also exhibit higher returns to observed skills.
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non-migrants only:
log w0i = Xi 0 + "0i (6)
The estimate of  0 measures returns to skills in the home country. Our data allow us to
include a large number of variables Xi to obtain a good prediction of earnings potential.
Xi contains variables that measure university experience (final university grade, age at
graduation, completing university with a bachelor’s degree, 24 subject fixed e↵ects, and
university fixed e↵ects), additional education after graduation (completing a PhD or a
non-PhD graduate degree), pre-university education (final high school grade and appren-
ticeship before studying), previous mobility (moving to another state between high school
and university), potential labor market experience, personal characteristics (gender, mar-
ital/partnership status, children), parental background (mother’s and father’s education
and occupation), and graduate cohort fixed e↵ects. The coe cients of the augmented
Mincer regression have the expected signs and magnitudes (Table 2, column 1).17 The
R2 of about 0.28 is high for a Mincer regression, suggesting that predicted earnings are
an informative skill measure for university graduates.18
Next, we predict potential earnings in the home country for migrants and non-
migrants. The predictions are based on the coe cient vector ( ˆ0) and on individual
characteristics Xi.
✓ˆ0i = Xi ˆ0 (7)
17Because all graduates are surveyed around five years after graduation, the variation in
potential labor market experience is small and estimated coe cients are di↵erent from the
typical pattern observed in Mincer regressions. The omitted degree is a Diplom/Magister
degree. Compared to graduates with these traditional degrees, graduates sampled after
completing a Bachelor’s degree have lower earnings.
18We show that our results are robust to excluding the controls for children and mari-
tal/partnership status from the wage regression (Online Appendix Figure A.5).
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We then use this measure of skills to compare three groups of interest: migrants to less
equal countries, migrants to more equal countries, and non-migrants. Specifically, we con-
struct Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) of predicted earnings ✓ˆ0 by migration
group, F (✓ˆ0 |Migration status), and plot them in the left panel of Figure 2(a).
The dashed line shows the CDF of non-migrants. The dark, solid line is the CDF of
migrants to less equal destinations, such as the United States. This CDF lies to the right
of the CDF for non-migrants, indicating that this group is positively selected in terms of
earnings potential. The migrants to these countries have skills which, according to the re-
turns in the Mincer regression, are valued more highly than those of non-migrants: median
log predicted earnings for these migrants are 10.65, compared to 10.61 for non-migrants.
The CDFs of non-migrants and of migrants to less equal countries do not cross, indicating
that these migrants are positively selected over the full range of predicted earnings. We
test the statistical significance of our findings in section 3.3.
The lighter, solid line shows the CDF of migrants to more equal destinations, such as
Sweden. It indicates that migrants to more equal countries are negatively selected relative
to non-migrants. Median log predicted earnings for these migrants are 10.56, compared
to 10.61 for non-migrants. The di↵erences between the CDFs are substantial and in the
same order of magnitude as standard estimates for the returns to an additional year of
education in the United States (Card, 1999).
Inequality varies across potential destination countries. We use this variation to ana-
lyze selection to countries with more extreme levels of (in)equality by splitting more and
less equal countries into two groups each. Thus, we now compare five types of destina-
tions: very unequal, somewhat unequal, home, somewhat equal, and very equal countries.
We classify the three countries with the most unequal earnings distributions as very un-
equal, and the three countries with the most equal distributions as very equal. Results
are shown in the right panel of Figure 2(a). Very unequal countries receive the most
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positively selected migrants; somewhat unequal countries receive somewhat positively se-
lected migrants; somewhat equal countries receive slightly negatively selected migrants;
and very equal countries receive strongly negatively selected migrants. The CDFs are
somewhat noisier than in the previous graphs because sample sizes of migrants are rela-
tively small, especially for equal countries. Nonetheless, the selection pattern follows the
theoretical predictions for the five groups.19
3.2 Controlling for Selection in the Augmented Mincer Regression
As our previous analysis has shown, migrants are systematically selected from the
home population. Unless this selection is fully accounted for by the observables, the
selection could potentially bias the coe cients of the augmented Mincer regression and
thus our measure of predicted earnings. We use a Heckman selection procedure to control
for this potential selection by estimating a selection equation that predicts whether a
graduate works in Germany or migrates abroad.
We use the introduction and expansion of the ERASMUS student exchange program as
an instrumental variable that predicts whether graduates work in Germany. ERASMUS
allows students to study abroad in a European country for one or two semesters before
they continue their studies in their home country. It was introduced in 1987 and increased
massively since then. In Germany, about 4,925 students participated in ERASMUS in
1990 (the year when the typical graduate of the 1993 cohort had studied abroad), and
participation rose to 18,482 in 2002 (the year when the typical graduate of the 2005 cohort
had studied abroad). The program was introduced at di↵erent times and expanded
at varying rates, depending on the university and department. Parey and Waldinger
(2011) show that the introduction and expansion of ERASMUS significantly increased
the probability of graduates moving abroad after completing their studies in Germany.
19In Online Appendix Figure A.6, we show results where we classify the four, instead
of three, most (un)equal countries as most (un)equal. The results are very similar.
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The ERASMUS instrument successfully controls for selection in the Mincer regression
if the number of ERASMUS places in a student’s university can be excluded from the
Mincer regression. Crucially, we do not use the actual decision to study abroad, but the
availability of department-level ERASMUS scholarship places, which predict studying
abroad and working abroad later on, to instrument for working in Germany.
In our data, the median graduate enrolled in university in 1991-92 and thus before
the widespread availability of the Internet. Before the introduction of the Internet, infor-
mation on the number of ERASMUS places was very di cult to obtain. Even today, few
department websites report the exact number of ERASMUS places. It is therefore unlikely
that students sorted into certain departments to benefit from more ERASMUS places.
To further limit the possiblity of student sorting, we assign the number of ERASMUS
places for the subject⇥university combination where a student first enrolls in university.
Any potential sorting after the first enrollment will therefore not a↵ect the exogeneity of
the ERASMUS instrument.
Students in certain subjects are systematically more likely to study abroad, and to
work abroad later on, than students in other subjects. We control for any such subject-
specific di↵erences by including 24 subject fixed e↵ects in the regressions. A related
concern may be that better universities o↵er more ERASMUS places and also facilitate
working abroad. We control for these university-specific di↵erences by including a full
set of university fixed e↵ects in the regressions. We also control for broader trends of
studying and working abroad by controlling for cohort fixed e↵ects.
Parey and Waldinger (2011) further discuss the exclusion restriction of the ERAS-
MUS instrument. They show that the expansion of ERASMUS in a department is not
correlated with a wider push to increase the international outlook of students. They also
show that the probability of studying abroad is completely flat before the introduction
of ERASMUS and only increases once ERASMUS has been introduced, suggesting that
18
pre-trends are not a↵ecting the validity of the ERASMUS instrument.
Column (3) of Table 2 shows the first-stage estimates where we regress whether in-
dividuals work in Germany on a measure of ERASMUS scholarship places (normalized
by the number of students) in a graduate’s university department. The availability of
ERASMUS significantly lowers the probability of working in Germany.
Column (2) in Table 2 shows that controlling for selection in the Mincer regression only
has a small e↵ect on the estimated coe cients. In addition to the rich set of observables,
this also reflects that the share of graduates not migrating (and thus observed in our
Mincer regression) is very high, and that selection of migrants occurs both at the top and
the bottom of the distribution. The coe cient on the Mills ratio is therefore quantitatively
small and insignificant. The resulting CDFs of earnings potential by migration status are
presented in Figure 2(b). They confirm that migrants to less equal destinations are
positively selected, while migrants to more equal destinations are negatively selected.
3.3 Tests for Stochastic Dominance
We investigate the statistical significance of the substantial di↵erences between the
CDFs with tests for first-order stochastic dominance. As we estimate the Mincer earnings
equation in the first step of our analysis and construct predicted earnings based on the
Mincer regression, we need to account for this additional source of uncertainty when we
compute p-values. We therefore apply the bootstrap procedure for stochastic dominance
tests developed in Barrett and Donald (2003) and described in further detail in Online
Appendix A.2. We also report p-values from conventional Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests,
which do not account for the uncertainty associated with the estimation of parameters in
the Mincer regression.
The corresponding test results are shown in Table 3. The top row of panel A indicates
that we can reject the null hypothesis that the more-equal-CDF dominates the CDF of
non-migrants (‘Home’) at the 1% level of significance (columns (1) to (3)). Similarly, the
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second row indicates that we can reject that the CDF of non-migrants dominates the
more-unequal-CDF at the 10% level. We also reject that the more-equal-CDF dominates
the less-equal-CDF at the 1% level. We even reject these hypotheses when we use the
Heckman selection-corrected estimates, as reported in columns (4) to (6).
The graphical analysis presented above suggests even more pronounced di↵erences
in the CDFs when we limit the comparison to very equal and very unequal countries,
respectively. Panel B of Table 3 indeed shows that the test statistic for the comparison
of these more extreme destinations increases substantially. Because the relevant samples
become smaller for destinations with more extreme levels of inequality, the p-values do not
decrease in all cases. Nonetheless, the test of stochastic dominance now rejects at the 5%
level for all three comparisons. Panel B of Table 3 also reports tests for selection between
more similar destinations. The test statistic always has the predicted sign, suggesting
that selection follows the basic Roy/Borjas model, even for more similar destinations. As
expected, selection patterns to the more similar destinations are often not statistically
significant because inequality di↵erences in more similar destinations are much lower and
because some country groups attract relatively few graduates. We also test the reverse
set of hypotheses and cannot reject them. The corresponding p-values are above 0.74 and
in most cases above 0.95 (Online Appendix Table A.5).
3.4 Selection of Migrants by Country
Our data also allow us to investigate the selection of migrants to each of the 19
destinations in our sample, and thereby go beyond the three or five groups of countries
presented in the previous section. We compute average predicted earnings of migrants to
each country and correlate them with the 75/25 ratio (Figure 3). Circle sizes indicate the
number of migrants in each country. Apart from a few outliers, migrants to more equal
countries have lower predicted earnings than migrants to less equal countries.
We estimate a weighted country-level OLS regression and show the corresponding
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prediction in Figure 3. In particular, we regress average predicted earnings (¯ˆ✓0c) on the
75/25 ratio in each country c:
¯ˆ✓0c =  0 +  175/25 ratioc + "c (8)
The estimated regression line ( ˆ1) has a slope of 0.153 with a standard error of 0.081
(Table 4, column (1), significant at the 10% level). This estimate indicates that migrants
to destinations with a 75/25 ratio that is higher by 0.4 (the di↵erence between Germany
and the United States) have predicted earnings that are 6.1 log points higher.
4 Robustness
4.1 Controlling for Possible Confounding Factors
The selection pattern described in the previous section is consistent with the theoret-
ical predictions of the Roy/Borjas model. Earnings inequality, however, is not the only
factor that di↵ers between home and destination countries. Countries may also di↵er
along other dimensions that could be correlated with migrant selection.
We first analyze whether confounding factors (Fc) are driving our selection results by
controlling for them in the cross-country regression (Table 4):
¯ˆ✓0c =  0 +  175/25 ratioc +  2 Fc + "c (9)
The Roy/Borjas model predicts that mean earnings should a↵ect the number of migrants
to each country but not the direction of selection. Nonetheless, di↵erences in mean earn-
ings will a↵ect migration choices and may be correlated with di↵erences in the 75/25
ratios. In our first robustness check, we therefore control for average log earnings in
each country. In this specification, the coe cient on the 75/25 ratio increases slightly to
0.180, suggesting an even stronger relationship between inequality and migrant selection
(column (2), significant at the 1% level). Migration decisions, especially those of lower-
skilled migrants (within the high-skilled population), may also be a↵ected by expected
unemployment spells. When we control for unemployment rates of tertiary-educated in-
dividuals the coe cient on the 75/25 ratio is equal to 0.174 (column (3), significant at the
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5% level). Migration decisions may also be a↵ected by di↵erences in child-care provision.
When we control for public expenditures on family benefits the coe cient on the 75/25
ratio is equal to 0.110 (column (4), significant at the 10% level). Migration decisions
may also be a↵ected by expectations about general well-being. When we control for a
measure of life satisfaction the coe cient on the 75/25 ratio is 0.247, confirming a strong
relationship between earnings inequality and migrant selection (column (5), significant
at the 1% level). When we control for all potential confounders at the same time the
coe cient on the 75/25 ratio is 0.147, with a p-value of 0.061 (column (6)).
The previous checks confirm a robust e↵ect of earnings inequality on mean selection
levels. In additional tests, we investigate how potential confounders a↵ect selection across
the whole distribution of skills. For these tests, we first replicate the CDFs from our main
results using quantile regressions, and then control for possible confounding factors using
the quantile regression framework. We regress predicted earnings of each individual i (✓ˆ0i)
on country group dummies separately for 100 centiles (⌧ = 0.01...0.99) of the predicted
earnings distribution:
✓ˆ0ic = 0⌧ +  1⌧Very Equalic +  2⌧Somewhat Equalic+
 3⌧Somewhat Unequalic +  4⌧Very Unequalic + ✏ic⌧
(10)
Very Equalic takes a value of 1 if the individual works in a country that is much more
equal than Germany, Somewhat Equalic takes a value of 1 if the individual works in a
country that is somewhat more equal, and so on. The constant represents predicted
earnings for individuals who work in Germany. Online Appendix Figure A.7(a) shows
the quantile regression equivalents of the CDFs in our main results. We then control for
potential confounding factors in the quantile regressions by adding country-level controls:
✓ˆ0ic = 0⌧ +  1⌧Very Equalic +  2⌧Somewhat Equalic+
 3⌧Somewhat Unequalic +  4⌧Very Unequalic +  5⌧Fc + ✏ic⌧
(11)
From the estimated coe cients, we predict CDFs for each group holding constant the
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value of the added covariate at the German level. Panels (b) to (f) of Online Appendix
Figure A.7 show CDFs that are adjusted for the same confounding factors that we have
analyzed in the cross-country regression (Table 4). The selection pattern to locations with
more extreme levels of (in)equality is robust to controlling for potentially confounding
factors. The selection pattern to locations with less extreme levels of (in)equality remains
broadly consistent with the predictions of the model (see Online Appendix Table A.7 for
stochastic dominance tests). If we control for mean earnings, the CDF for somewhat un-
equal countries sometimes moves to the left of the CDF for graduates at home. However,
the stochastic dominance tests indicate that the two CDFs are not significantly di↵erent.
4.2 Sensitivity of Results to Alternative Inequality Measures
In Appendix Section A.4, we investigate the sensitivity of our main results to using
alternative measures of inequality. We show that the results are very similar for a range
of inequality measures, including the 90/50 ratio, the 75/25 ratio, the 90/10 inequality
ratio, the Gini coe cient and the Theil index.
4.3 Selection to Europe and to Austria/Switzerland
Additionally, we investigate selection to European countries only. German citizens
who migrate to these countries face virtually no migration barriers, such as visa require-
ments. Germans can settle freely in any country of the European Union and in other
European countries, such as Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.20 Furthermore, mi-
gration costs to these countries are relatively low because distances within Europe are
small, and travel costs are low.
We plot CDFs of predicted earnings of migrants to less equal countries, migrants to
more equal countries, and non-migrants (Figure 4(a)). As for the full sample, migrants
to more equal European countries are negatively selected, and migrants to less equal
20Graduates from the 1993 to 2001 cohorts who migrated to Poland or Switzerland had
minor restrictions to settle in these countries.
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European destinations are positively selected, compared to non-migrants.21 These results
suggest that di↵erential migration costs are not driving our main results.
We also investigate migrant selection to Austria and Switzerland only. These two
countries are very similar to Germany along many dimensions that may a↵ect migration
choices. The countries have similar education systems with very similar university gradu-
ation rates (OECD, 2013b, p. 61). The countries also have similar unemployment benefits
as measured by replacement rates that ranged between 29% and 33% of gross incomes
in 2005 (OECD, 2015). The three countries also share a similar culture. Finally, Austria
is German speaking and in Switzerland 64% of the population is German-speaking, and
more than 90% of Germans migrants settle in predominately German-speaking regions
of Switzerland (BFS, 2010, 2013). While the three countries are similar along many di-
mensions, they di↵er in earnings inequality. Both Austria and Switzerland are less equal
than Germany. The CDF of predicted earnings of migrants to Austria and Switzerland
lies to the right of the non-migrant CDF (Figure 4(b)).22 These results indicate that
migrants to Austria and Switzerland are positively selected compared to non-migrants,
as predicted by the Roy/Borjas model.
5 Further Results
5.1 Decomposing Migrant Selection
Predicted earnings can be considered a summary measure of di↵erent skills. To un-
derstand the characteristics that underlie the observed selection, we use a Blinder-Oaxaca
21We reject that the CDF of migrants to more equal countries dominates the home
CDF at the 5% level (Online Appendix Table A.9). As Europe contains few countries
with very high inequality, we no longer reject that the home CDF dominates the CDF of
migrants to less equal countries (p-value of 0.19).
22The test that the home CDF dominates the Austria/Switzerland CDF is rejected at
the 10% level (Online Appendix Table A.9, panel B).
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procedure, decomposing the overall di↵erence in predicted earnings into the contibution of
each characteristic. For expositional purposes we group characteristics into 13 categories.
The positive selection of migrants to less equal countries mostly reflects their university
career (Figure 5, panel (a1)). They have better grades and attend better universities
than non-migrants. The negative selection of migrants to more equal countries reflects
their university subject, university quality, and gender (panel (a2)). They study subjects
with lower returns in the labor market, enroll at universities with less favorable labor
market prospects, and are more often female. Interestingly, migrants to more equal
countries have better grades at university, despite being negatively selected overall. This
is consistent with findings suggesting that migrants are positively selected when skill is
measured in terms of education. Decomposition results that use coe cients from the
selection-corrected Mincer regression are shown in Online Appendix Figure A.9.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 5 summarize how the covariates of the decomposition line
up with the overall prediction. For most characteristics, the table shows no significant
deviations from the model predictions. However, there are a number of interesting dif-
ferences between the relevance of individual characteristics between less equal and more
equal countries. For less equal countries, the pattern of selection in terms of apprentice-
ship training is not in line with our baseline prediction, and for more equal countries,
university grade shows significant positive selection among the migrants. Although we do
not have the detailed data to investigate these instances, they may reflect heterogeneity
in returns to characteristics across countries or a correlation of these characteristics with
the willingness to move, in a way not captured by the model. For example, it is plausible
that (former) apprentices may realize a higher return to their training in their home labor
market and are therefore more attached to their home labor market.
It is important to keep in mind that Figure 5 shows the results of a statistical de-
composition and that the characteristics may be correlated with each other. Predicted
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earnings provide a natural way of combining the individual characteristics in a summary
measure.
5.2 Migration to the United States
Migrants to the United States Compared to Non-Migrants in Germany
In the final section, we investigate migrant selection to the United States. The United
States is an important destination for university graduates from Germany. In our sample,
more than 13% of graduates who go abroad move to the United States; only Switzerland
attracts more graduates from Germany. Because U.S. inequality is highest among the
major destinations of German university graduates, we expect that German university
graduates who migrate to the United States are particularly positively selected.
The CDF of migrants to the United States always lies to the right of the non-migrant
CDF (left panel of Figure 6(a)). The di↵erence between the CDFs of U.S. migrants and
non-migrants is more pronounced than the di↵erence between the CDFs of all migrants to
less equal countries and non-migrants. This highlights the particularly positive selection
of migrants to the United States. The test of stochastic dominance is rejected at the 5%
level (see Online Appendix Table A.9, panel C).
As above, we decompose the di↵erence in predicted earnings between migrants to
the United States and non-migrants. U.S. migrants are positively selected according to
almost all characteristics, in particular characteristics that relate to the university career
and gender. Migrants to the United States study subjects with especially high returns
(see third bar from the top in the right panel of Figure 6(a)). They are particularly
concentrated in STEM fields. In our sample, about 17.2% of migrants to the United
States hold a degree in physics (but only 3.9% of non-migrants), 9.2% hold a degree
in biology (non-migrants: 2.3%), and 8.1% hold a degree in chemistry (non-migrants:
3.0%). Furthermore, migrants to the United States are also more likely to hold degrees
in computer science, economics and management, geography, and engineering; and they
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are less likely to hold degrees in law, languages, medicine, architecture, and education.
Migrants to the United States also obtain higher grades in university than non-migrants.
They also study in universities where graduates have higher predicted earnings.
The decomposition indicates that the United States attracts high-skilled migrants
from Germany who have studied in better universities, received higher grades, and are
concentrated in high-paying STEM fields. Thus, migrants to the United States are pre-
cisely those that are considered to be important for innovation and technological progress.
Migrants from Germany Compared to U.S. Natives in the ACS
Finally, we investigate how high-skilled migrants from Germany fare in the U.S. la-
bor market by comparing earnings potential of high-skilled migrants from Germany to
high-skilled natives in the United States. For this test, we use data from the American
Community Survey (ACS), and identify high-skilled migrants from Germany as individ-
uals who were born in Germany to non-U.S. parents, who migrated to the United States
between 1996 and 2010 and were at least 25 years old at the time of migration. These re-
strictions ensure that our sample of Germans in the United States is as similar as possible
to the sample of graduate emigrants from Germany who we study in our main results. To
focus our analysis on the high-skilled, we limit the sample to individuals with a bachelor’s
degree or higher, who worked for 50 to 52 weeks per year in full-time jobs, and who are
30 to 45 years old (see Data Appendix B.1.4 for further details on the ACS data).23
We then compare predicted earnings of migrants from Germany to earnings of U.S.
natives. We evaluate the skills of German immigrants to the United States using predicted
earnings that we construct from returns to skills for U.S. natives (see Online Appendix
Table A.10, column (1) for returns to skills for U.S. natives). In terms of the Roy/Borjas
23Results are similar if we restrict the ACS sample to graduates in more academically
oriented subjects to further increase the comparability with graduates from traditional
universities in Germany.
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model presented above, this test compares the distribution of ✓ˆ1 of German migrants in
the United States to U.S. natives, while our previous results compared distributions of ✓ˆ0
of migrants and non-migrants.24 Indeed, our results show that compared to high-skilled
U.S. natives, recent migrants from Germany have far higher predicted earnings in the
U.S. labor market. The CDF of predicted earnings of German immigrants lies to the
right of the native CDF along the whole earnings distribution (left panel of Figure 6(b)).
At the median, log predicted earnings of migrants from Germany are 11.383, while log
earnings of natives are 11.129. At the 25th and 75th percentiles, migrants from Germany
have predicted earnings of 11.193 and 11.554, while natives have predicted earnings of
10.937 and 11.334. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the stronger degree
selection in terms of ✓1 (relative to our earlier results in terms of ✓0) can be reconciled
with our theoretical prediction, both qualitatively and quantitatively.25
Overall, these results indicate that high-skilled individuals who migrate from Germany
to the United States are not only positively selected compared to Germans who do not
migrate, but also compared to non-migrants in the United States. To investigate the
contribution of di↵erent characteristics, we also decompose the di↵erence in predicted
earnings between German migrants to the United States and U.S. natives. Because the
24Parallel to equation (5), the corresponding equation for selection in terms of earnings










25The selection in terms of ✓1 should be stronger than selection in terms of ✓0 by a
factor of ( ✓1/ ✓0   ⇢✓) / (⇢✓    ✓0/ ✓1). Between the United States and Germany, the
ratio  ✓0/ ✓1 is about 0.8 in our data. While ⇢✓ is unknown, the positive selection in
terms of ✓0 indicates that ⇢✓ is above 0.8 (from equation (5)). Suppose ⇢✓ = 0.9, then
the factor results in a value of 3.7, which is broadly similar but slightly larger than the
observed di↵erence in selection. Because the factor decreases in ⇢✓, it is straightforward
to reconcile the observed di↵erence in selection with a value of ⇢✓ somewhat above 0.9.
ACS data are less detailed than our graduate survey data, the decomposition involves
fewer characteristics. Compared to U.S. natives, German migrants have more advanced
degrees (such as professional degrees or PhDs) and graduated in subjects (in particular
STEM subjects) that typically lead to higher-paid employment. German migrants are
also less likely to be female than U.S. natives. Overall, the positive selection compared to
U.S. natives reflects similar characteristics as the ones we find for the positive selection
compared to German non-migrants.
6 Conclusion
The seminal work of Borjas has emphasized how migrant selection is driven by inequal-
ity in home and destination countries: high-skilled individuals benefit from the upside
opportunities in less equal countries, and low-skilled individuals benefit from the insur-
ance of a more compressed wage distribution in more equal countries. This insight has
motivated various empirical tests of the Borjas model. In spite of the large di↵erences in
inequality across many home-destination country pairs, the empirical evidence is mixed.
In this paper, we investigate selection within the group of high-skilled migrants in a
setting where migration costs are particularly low. We use predicted wages to measure
the skills of migrants and graduates who remain at home. Consistent with the predictions
of the basic Roy/Borjas model, we find that migrants to more equal countries, such as
Denmark, are negatively selected compared to non-migrants. Migrants to less equal coun-
tries, such as the United States, are positively selected. In further results we show that
migrant selection follows the predictions of the Roy/Borjas model even within subgroups
of either more or less equal countries.
Our results are robust to controlling for potentially confounding factors and to using
alternative measures of inequality in destination countries. We also demonstrate that
the selection pattern holds when we study migration within Europe, and migration to
Austria and Switzerland only, where barriers to migration are particularly low. When
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we decompose predicted earnings into various skill components, we find that selection
patterns follow the model prediction for most, but not all, characteristics, suggesting
that the choice of the skill measure can a↵ect findings of migrant selection.
Overall, our findings highlight the importance of the Roy/Borjas model for the selec-
tion of high-skilled migrants.
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Figure 1: Earnings inequality among the high-skilled: Ratio of 75th to 25th percentile in





















1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
75/25 ratio, university graduates
Notes: The figure shows the ratio of the 75th to the 25th percentile in the earnings distri-
bution of university graduates. Authors’ calculations based on country-specific earnings
surveys (see Online Appendix Table A.3), showing averages over the period 1998 to 2010.
Details on data sources and the construction of inequality measures are reported in sec-
tion ?? and Data Appendix B.1.
Figure 2: Predicted earnings of migrants and non-migrants














































































Notes: Figure (a) shows CDFs of predicted earnings that are based on returns reported in column (1) of Table 2 for three groups: migrants
to more equal countries, non-migrants, and migrants to less equal countries (left panel) and for five groups: migrants to very equal countries,
migrants to somewhat equal countries, non-migrants, migrants to somewhat unequal countries, and migrants to very unequal countries (right
panel). Figure (b) shows CDFs of predicted earnings that are based on selection-corrected returns reported in column (2) of Table 2 for the same
groups of countries. Table 3 reports stochastic dominance tests. Online Appendix Figure A.2 shows kernel smoothed versions of the CDFs.








































1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9
75/25 ratio
Notes: The figure shows average predicted earnings for migrants to each country and
the corresponding 75/25 inequality ratio. Circle sizes are proportional to the number
of migrants in each destination. The regression line reported in the figure is estimated
in a weighted regression with weights equal to the number of migrants in each country.
The slope coe cient is equal to 0.153 with a standard error of 0.081. An unweighted
regression has a slope equal to 0.103 with a standard error of 0.101. For country labels
see Data Appendix Table B.2.
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Log predicted earnings
Home (N=10,510)
Austria and Switzerland (N=194)
Notes: The figure shows CDFs of predicted earnings (prediction based on selection-
corrected returns reported in column (2) of Table 2) for migrants to Europe (EU coun-
tries (2005), Norway, and Switzerland) and non-migrants in panel (a); and to Austria or
Switzerland and non-migrants in panel (b). Online Appendix Table A.9 (panels A and
B) reports stochastic dominance tests.
Figure 5: Decomposition of predicted earnings
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(a1) Migrants to less equal countries
(a2) Migrants to more equal countries
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(b1) Migrants to very unequal countries
(b2) Migrants to very equal countries
Notes: Panel (a1) decomposes the mean di↵erence in predicted earnings between mi-
grants to less equal countries and non-migrants. The top bar (black) measures the total
di↵erence in predicted earnings. The other bars decompose the total di↵erence into the
contributions of groups of characteristics (e.g. university grade). More specifically, the
size of the gray bars in panel (a1) is obtained by multiplying estimated returns ( ˆHomek )
for non-migrants from column (1) in Table 2 (where k indexes a group of characteris-
tics, e.g. all parental background variables or all university fixed e↵ects) with average
characteristics of migrants to less equal countries (xLess equalk ) and average characteristics









(a2) presents the equivalent decomposition between migrants to more equal destinations
and non-migrants. Panel (b) presents corresponding results to very unequal and very
equal countries. Diamonds indicate 90% confidence intervals. Confidence intervals and
p-values are obtained from bootstrapped standard errors (based on 4,999 replications).
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure 6: Predicted earnings of migrants to the United States
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Notes: Figure (a): The left panel shows CDFs of predicted earnings (prediction based on
selection-corrected returns reported in column (2) of Table 2) for migrants to the United
States and for non-migrants. Online Appendix Table A.9 (panel C) reports stochastic
dominance tests. The right panel decomposes the mean di↵erence in predicted earnings
between migrants to the United States and non-migrants. The top bar (black) measures
the total di↵erence in predicted earnings. The other bars decompose the total di↵erence
into the contributions of groups of characteristics (e.g. university grade). Figure (b):
The left panel shows CDFs of predicted earnings in the United States. Prediction based
on coe cients of the Mincer regression reported in Online Appendix Table A.10 (column
(1)) using American Community Survey (ACS) data on U.S. natives. The right panel
shows a decomposition of predicted earnings that decomposes the mean di↵erence in
predicted earnings between German migrants to the United States and U.S. natives. Di-
amonds indicate 90% confidence intervals. Confidence intervals and p-values are obtained
from bootstrapped standard errors (based on 4,999 replications). Significance levels: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1: Summary statistics for German university graduates
Working Abroad Abroad
Full sample in Germany more equal less equal
Mean SD Mean Mean Mean
Job characteristics (after five years)
Working abroad 0.052 – 0 1 1
Annual earnings in Euro (2001 prices) 43,491 19,334 43,265 39,458 49,231
Potential experience in months 69.201 4.161 69.197 69.719 69.194
Postgraduate education
PhD completed 0.191 – 0.182 0.313 0.371
Further (non-PhD) degree completed 0.073 – 0.071 0.125 0.122
Education first degree
Final university grade 2.018 0.681 2.032 1.698 1.787
Studying abroad 0.078 – 0.072 0.240 0.169
Age at graduation 26.994 2.664 27.026 26.271 26.437
ERASMUS/Total students in subject 0.040 0.057 0.039 0.052 0.050
Education before first degree
Final school grade 2.110 0.639 2.119 1.951 1.959
Apprenticeship 0.220 – 0.225 0.094 0.138
Previous mobility
Studied in same state as high school 0.659 – 0.663 0.583 0.581
Personal characteristics
Female 0.445 – 0.444 0.594 0.445
Partner 0.780 – 0.782 0.740 0.736
Married 0.416 – 0.421 0.281 0.344
Child(ren) 0.291 – 0.297 0.156 0.184
Parental background
Mother’s education (years) 13.459 3.102 13.423 14.458 14.035
Father’s education (years) 14.852 3.065 14.816 15.458 15.493
Mother self-employed 0.092 – 0.093 0.063 0.091
Mother salaried employee 0.597 – 0.596 0.677 0.619
Mother civil servant 0.108 – 0.105 0.177 0.148
Mother worker 0.100 – 0.103 0.042 0.049
Mother did not work 0.103 – 0.104 0.041 0.093
Father self-employed 0.194 – 0.191 0.188 0.262
Father salaried employee 0.447 – 0.448 0.479 0.406
Father civil servant 0.223 – 0.221 0.271 0.258
Father worker 0.113 – 0.116 0.063 0.062
Father did not work 0.023 – 0.024 0.000 0.012
Observations 11,091 10,510 96 485
Notes: The table shows summary statistics of German university graduates at five
years after graduation. Information on earnings is available for 10,315 of the 11,091
graduates. Average annual earnings of 43,491 Euros in 2001 prices correspond to
around 79,084 U.S. dollars in 2014 prices.
Table 2: Augmented Mincer regression for university graduates in Germany
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Labor earnings Labor earnings Working in Germany
OLS Heckman sel. model Selection equation
Education first degree
Final university grade 0.048* (0.027) 0.046* (0.027) 0.079 (0.203)
Final grade squared -0.023*** (0.006) -0.023*** (0.006) -0.007 (0.048)
Bachelor’s degree -0.131*** (0.028) -0.132*** (0.028) 0.049 (0.158)
Age at graduation -0.026** (0.011) -0.026** (0.011) -0.013 (0.097)
Age squared 0.000* (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 0.001 (0.002)
Postgraduate education
PhD completed -0.003 (0.011) 0.000 (0.013) -0.367*** (0.065)
Further (non-PhD) degree completed -0.024 (0.015) -0.021 (0.016) -0.251*** (0.085)
Education before first degree
Final school grade -0.041 (0.034) -0.043 (0.034) 0.109 (0.224)
School grade squared 0.009 (0.008) 0.010 (0.008) -0.011 (0.052)
Apprenticeship 0.037*** (0.010) 0.037*** (0.010) 0.078 (0.071)
Previous mobility
Studied in same state as high school -0.010 (0.008) -0.012 (0.008) 0.131*** (0.049)
Potential work experience
Experience in months -0.058*** (0.022) -0.059*** (0.022) 0.096 (0.138)
Experience squared 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) -0.001 (0.001)
Personal characteristics
Female -0.131*** (0.008) -0.131*** (0.008) -0.047 (0.053)
Partner 0.066*** (0.009) 0.065*** (0.009) 0.070 (0.058)
Married (additionally) 0.028*** (0.009) 0.028*** (0.009) 0.027 (0.058)
Child(ren) -0.040*** (0.009) -0.041*** (0.010) 0.210*** (0.065)
Parental background
Mother’s education (years) 0.003* (0.002) 0.003* (0.002) -0.002 (0.010)
Father’s education (years) 0.003* (0.002) 0.003* (0.002) -0.019* (0.010)
Mother self-employed -0.008 (0.017) -0.009 (0.017) 0.107 (0.112)
Mother salaried employee -0.012 (0.013) -0.012 (0.013) 0.010 (0.086)
Mother civil servant -0.019 (0.018) -0.019 (0.017) -0.013 (0.112)
Mother worker -0.001 (0.016) -0.003 (0.016) 0.194 (0.122)
Father self-employed 0.054** (0.025) 0.056** (0.025) -0.260 (0.195)
Father salaried employee 0.041* (0.024) 0.041* (0.024) -0.053 (0.192)
Father civil servant 0.027 (0.025) 0.028 (0.025) -0.132 (0.196)
Father worker 0.003 (0.026) 0.003 (0.026) 0.009 (0.209)
ERASMUS places/students -1.197*** (0.424)
Mills ratio -0.050 (0.095)
Graduate cohort FE YES YES YES
Subject FE YES YES YES
University FE YES YES YES
R-sq./Pseudo R-sq. 0.282 0.132
Observations 9,778 9,778 10,315
Notes: Column (1) reports results from the augmented Mincer regression. Column
(2) reports results from the augmented Mincer regression that controls for selection
in the decision to work in Germany using a Heckman selection correction. Column
(3) reports the corresponding selection equation, which predicts working in Germany
with the number of ERASMUS places normalized by the cohort size in a graduate’s
university department. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3: Stochastic dominance tests
OLS Heckman selection correction
p-value p-value
Test Kolmogorov- Barrett- Test Kolmogorov- Barrett-
statistic Smirnov Donald statistic Smirnov Donald
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Selection to more equal and to less equal destinations
‘Equal’ vs ‘Home’ 0.187 0.001 *** 0.006 *** 0.182 0.002 *** 0.022 **
‘Home’ vs ‘Unequal’ 0.061 0.031 ** 0.098 * 0.071 0.009 *** 0.083 *
‘Equal’ vs ‘Unequal’ 0.220 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.218 0.000 *** 0.004 ***
Panel B: Selection to very equal , to somewhat equal ,
to somewhat unequal , and to very unequal destinations
Stochastic dominance tests for very equal and very unequal destinations
‘Very equal’ vs ‘Home’ 0.258 0.007 *** 0.018 ** 0.249 0.009 *** 0.041 **
‘Home’ vs ‘Very unequal’ 0.144 0.004 *** 0.017 ** 0.162 0.001 *** 0.014 **
‘Very equal’ vs ‘Very unequal’ 0.301 0.005 *** 0.008 *** 0.301 0.005 *** 0.012 **
Stochastic dominance tests for more similar destinations
‘Very equal’ vs ‘Somewhat equal’ 0.179 0.231 0.379 0.196 0.171 0.310
‘Somewhat equal’ vs ‘Home’ 0.147 0.083 * 0.177 0.142 0.099 * 0.171
‘Home’ vs ‘Somewhat unequal’ 0.057 0.109 0.235 0.065 0.055 * 0.173
‘Somewhat unequal’ vs ‘Very unequal’ 0.133 0.033 ** 0.101 0.136 0.027 ** 0.096 *
Notes: The table reports one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Barrett and Donald p-values for CDFs in Figure 2. Barrett
and Donald p-values are bootstrapped, following equation (11) in Barrett and Don-
ald (2003, p. 82). In the top row (‘Equal’ versus ‘Home’), we test the null hypothesis
that the CDF of migrants to more equal destinations stochastically dominates the
CDF of non-migrants, and similarly for other rows. The bootstrap is based on 4,999
replications. See text for details. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Cross-country regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
75/25 ratio 0.153* 0.180*** 0.174** 0.110* 0.247*** 0.147*
(0.081) (0.058) (0.077) (0.057) (0.081) (0.071)
Mean earnings 0.110*** 0.102*
(0.033) (0.056)
Tertiary-educated unemployment share -0.007 0.005
(0.007) (0.009)
Family expenditure -0.023* -0.012
(0.011) (0.011)
Life satisfaction 0.050* 0.003
(0.024) (0.036)
Constant 10.366*** 9.161*** 10.353*** 10.484*** 9.849*** 9.281***
(0.144) (0.413) (0.138) (0.104) (0.276) (0.531)
R-sq. 0.183 0.475 0.204 0.317 0.282 0.514
Observations 19 19 19 19 19 19
Notes: The table reports weighted regressions of average predicted earnings of mi-
grants in each country on the corresponding 75/25 ratio and potential confounders.
See Data Appendix B.2 for details on data sources and Data Appendix Table B.2 for
country data. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5: Summary of decomposition results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Less equal More equal Very unequal Very equal United States
destinations destinations destinations destinations
Total consistent consistent consistent consistent consistent
University grade consistent reject consistent reject consistent
University subject – consistent – consistent –
University fixed e↵ect consistent – – – –
Bachelor – – – – consistent
Further studies – – – – –
School grade – – – – –
Apprenticeship reject consistent reject consistent reject
Previous mobility – – – – –
Age/Experience consistent – consistent – consistent
Gender – consistent – consistent consistent
Partner/Children – – – – –
Parental background consistent – consistent – consistent
Graduate cohort – – – – –
Notes: The table summarizes results from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition shown
in Figure 5 and 6(a). ‘Consistent’ indicates that the selection along the corresponding
characteristic is significantly di↵erent from 0 at a 5% level of significance and in line
with the model prediction. ‘Reject’ indicates that the selection along the corresponding
characteristic is significantly di↵erent from 0 at a 5% level of significance, in the direction
not in line with the model prediction.
